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The Case Against Fact Pleading
in Louisiana
Henry G. McMahon*
"'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean-neither
more nor less'
"'The question is, said Alice, 'whether you can make words
mean so many different things.
"'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be
master-that's all.' ''
Through the medium of this colloquy in his fantasy, Lewis
Carroll rather subtly makes the point that words sometimes
prove to be the most elusive and slippery of labels. We are all
Humpty Dumptys, so that words always mean just what we
choose them to mean; but the difficulty lies in the fact that,
without ever being aware of it, different persons do not always
choose to make the same words mean the same things. When
this occurs, divergent opinions are as apt as not to be bottomed
on no more solid a foundation than unrecognized differences of
definition. This is particularly true of our present subject, where
the competing meanings of words represent merely a difference
of degree.
These subtle differences of definition constitute the initial
danger faced by anyone writing a criticism of the system of fact
pleading in Louisiana and other American jurisdictions. As long
as all schools of procedural philosophy agree that the functions
of pleading include the giving of fair notice to the adversary
and providing the basis of res judicata, there will be no disagree-
ment upon the necessity of alleging some factual particulars.
All .systems of pleading insist upon averments of the circum-
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Coordinator and Re-
porter, Louisiana Code of Practice Revision, Louisiana State Law Institute.
In submitting this paper, the writer is presenting only his individual views,
and is not speaking, or attempting to speak, for the Louisiana State Law
Institute or its Council.
1. Carroll, Through the Looking-Glass, Chapter VI.
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stances of time and place and, at least in certain extraordinary
types of cases, require allegations of the factual particulars giving
rise to the controversy. This is true even of pleading under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which has expressly repudiated
"fact pleading." Under a regime of adjective law which regards
the primary function of pleading as the giving of fair notice to
the adverse party, specific averments of time and place are
recognized as being indispensable. For this reason, the Federal
Rules provide that for "the purpose of testing the sufficiency of
a pleading, averments of time and place are material and shall
be considered like all other averments of material matter."'2 Simi-
larly, it is recognized that any claim or defense based on a con-
tention of fraud or mistake, and yet averred only generally in the
form of a legal conclusion, would signally fail in performing the
function of giving adequate notice to the adverse party; hence,
the requirement of the Federal Rules that in "all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake
shall be stated with particularity."3 A complaint in an injunction
suit would hardly provide adequate notice of the plaintiff's griev-
ance, or just what contemplated actions of defendant the plain-
tiff was seeking to enjoin, if such conduct, as well as the irrep-
arable injury claimed to be impending, were alleged generally,
and then only by legal inferences. For this reason, under federal
practice it is required that these matters appear from specific
facts shown by either the verified complaint or an affidavit
annexed thereto. 4
Our conception of "fact pleading," therefore, should not be
regarded as including every form of pleading which either per-
mits or requires some factual allegations. The writer, like
Humpty Dumpty, has no intention of letting words become the
master; but perhaps before going further into the subject, the
writer should delimit and mark off the boundaries of his terms.
2. Rule 9 (f), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. Rule 9 (b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. "No temporary restraining order shall be granted without notice to the
adverse party unless it clearly appears from specific facts shown by affidavit
or by the verified complaint that immediate and irreparable injury, loss or
damage will result to the applicant before notice can be served and a hearing
had thereon." Rule 65 (b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Even though
only a preliminary injunction or permanent injunction is at issue, the cam-
plaint must allege the facts and circumstances with particularity. 3 Barron
& Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1434, p. 312 (1950); Patten v.
Dennis, 134 Fed. 137 (9th Cir. 1943); Bowles v. John F. Casey Co., 5 F.R.D.
143 (D.C. Pa. 1946); Dickert v. Hickey, 47 F. Supp. 577 (D.C. N.Y. 1940). See,
also, Bowles v. Deep Vein Connellsville Coke Co., 5 F.R.D. 140 (D.C. Pa. 1946).
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FACT PLEADING DEFINED
"Fact pleading" is universally restricted by American stu-
dents of civil procedure to the particular system of pleading
which originated in the Field Code of Procedure of New York
in 1848. Its chief characteristic is the requirement of pleading
ultimate facts (as distinguished from evidentiary facts on the
one hand, and conclusions of law on the other). Generally, this
system is regarded as possessing three additional characteristics,
which actually are corollaries stemming from the principal re-
quirement of pleading ultimate facts. These other characteristics
consist of the prohibition against the inclusion of evidentiary
facts in the pleading, the denial of any effect to be given the
pleading of conclusions of law, and the requirement of pleading
full factual particulars in all cases.
Possibly as a result of Louisiana's original heritage of sim-
plicity of pleading and freedom from unnecessary technicalities,
our administration of justice has never been burdened with rules
which require the striking of evidentiary facts from the plead-
ing, or which compel amendment of a pleading to delete allega-
tions of evidentiary facts.5 The other characteristics of the sys-
tem, however, have found complete recognition in the Louisiana
cases of the past forty years. Hence, for present purposes, and
specifically as applied to Louisiana law, fact pleading is to be
considered as including only the following characteristics of our
present system of pleading:
(1) the required pleading of the ultimate facts which consti-
tute the cause of action and defense;6
(2) the denial of any legal effect to be given to the plead-
5. In years of research in the civil procedure of Louisiana, the writer
has never read a case in which any objection had been made to a pleading
on the ground that its allegations consisted of evidentiary, rather than ulti-
mate, facts.
6. State v. Hackley, Hume & Joyce, 124 La. 854, 50 So. 772 (1909); Coquen-
ham v. Avoca Drainage Dist., 130 La. 323, 57 So. 989 (1912); Levy v. Desposito,
133 La. 126, 62 So. 599 (1913); Arent v. Liquidating Com'rs of Bank of Monroe,
133 La. 134, 62 So. 602 (1913) Hills v. City of New Orleans, 139 La. 537, 71 So.
797 (1916); Kirkpatrick v. City of Monroe, 157 La. 645, 102 So. 822 (1925);
Favrot, 170 La. 483, 128 So. 284 (1930); Crichton v. Louisiana Highway Com-
mission, 172 La. 1033, 136 So. 43 (1931); State ex rel. Garland v. Guillory, 184
La. 329, 166 So. 94 (1935); Sellwood v. Phillips, 185 La. 1045, 171 So. 440 (1936);
New Orleans Public Service v. Lind, 10 La. App. 736, 121 So. 785 (1929);
Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Romero, 10 La. App. 796, 122 So. 288 (1929);
Vaccaro v. Favrot, 13 La. App. 120, 125 So. 296 (1929); Central Say. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Succession of Brandon, 167 So. 515 (La. App. 1936).
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ing of conclusions of law not supported by allegations of ultimate
fact;'7 and
(3) the required pleading of full factual particulars in all
cases, under penalty of compulsory amendment of an offending
petitions or, exclusion of evidence to support a defense pleaded
only generally.9
ORIGIN OF FACT PLEADING
"At common law, facts also were to be pleaded; but, with
the emphasis placed especially upon the development of an issue
and the natural tendency of all pleading to become formal,
common-law pleading had come in a large measure to employ
formal general statements which did not distinctly set forth the
pleader's case."' 0 Under the English equity system, since there
was no separate body for the trial of facts, there was an absence
of emphasis upon the formulation of issues. No formal trial with
witnesses ordinarily was had in equity cases until relatively mod-
ern times; hence the pleadings in equity were quite detailed,
since, being sworn to, they provided the facts upon which the
case was decided."
7. State v. Hackley, Hume & Joyce, 124 La. 854, 50 So. 772 (1909); Coquen-
ham v. Avoca Drainage Dist., 130 La. 323, 57 So. 989 (1912); Levy v. Desposito,
133 La. 126, 62 So. 599 (1913); Arent v. Liquidating Com'rs of Bank of Monroe,
133 La. 134, 62 So. 602 (1913); First Natchez Bank v. Malarcher-Damare Co.,
135 La. 295, 65 So. 270 (1914); Hills v. City of New Orleans, 139 La. 537, 71 So.
797 (1916); Kirkpatrick v. City of Monroe, 157 La. 645, 102 So. 822 (1925);
Zibilich v. Rouseo, 157 La. 936, 103 So. 269 (1925); State ex rel. Garland v.
Guillory, 184 La. 329, 166 So. 94 (1935); Sellwood v. Phillips, 185 La. 1045, 171
So. 440 (1936); New Orleans Public Service v. Lind, 10 La. App. 736, 121 So.
785 (1929); Fidelity Union Casualty Co. v. Romero, 10 La. App. 796, 122 So.
288 (1929); Vaccaro v. Favrot, 13 La. App. 120, 125 So. 296 (1929); Eames v.
Alexandria Contracting Co., 154 So. 510 (La. App. 1934); Central Say. Bank &
Trust Co. v. Succession of Brandon, 167 So. 515 (La. App. 1936).
8. The effect of the trial court's maintaining of an exception of vagueness
is to require the removal of the vagueness, obscurity, or generality com-
plained of through amendment of the petition, under penalty of dismissal
of the suit for noncompliance with the order requiring amendment. Gold-
smith v. Virgin, 122 La. 831, 48 So. 279 (1909); Dronette v. Meaux Bros., 156
La. 239, 100 So. 411 (1924); Moore v. Moore, 192 La. 289, 187 So. 670 (1939);
Foster & Glassel Corp. v. Ackel, 166 So. 885 (La. App. 1936); Pearce v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 8 So. 2d 743 (La. App. 1942).
9. Godchaux v. Hyde, 126 La. 187, 52 So. 269 (1910); Ouachita Nat. Bank
v. McIlhenny, 169 La. 258, 125 So. 69 (1929); Masters v. Cleveland, 182 La. 483,
162 So. 51 (1935); Sellwood v. Phillips, 185 La. 1045, 171 So. 440 (1936); Arcadia
Lumber Co. v. Austin, 15 La. App. 212, 131 So. 601 (1930); Quatray v. Wicker,
16 La. App. 515, 134 So. 313 (1931); Bloomenstiel v. McKeithen, 19 La. App.
513, 139 So. 519 (1932); Martin v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 162 So. 257
(La. App. 1935). This rule was criticized severely by the writer in The
Exception of No Cause of Action in Louisiana, 9 Tulane L. Rev. 17, 34-36
(1934).
10. Clark on Code Pleading 225 (2 ed. 1947).
11. Ibid.
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When New York in 1848, under the leadership of David
Dudley Field, effected a fusion of law and equity through the
adoption of its Code of Procedure,12 it suppressed the common
law forms of actions and common law pleading. The draftsmen
of the new procedural code attempted to simplify pleading even
beyond the relative simplicity of contemporaneous equity plead-
ing. "The complaint must contain ... a plain and concise state-
ment of the facts, constituting each cause of action, without
unnecessary repetition."13 Other pleadings were placed on the
same plane of apparent simplicity as the complaint. All plead-
ings were to consist of allegations of ultimate facts-the material,
operative facts-as contradistinguished from the "evidential"
or "evidentiary" facts, on the one hand, and "conclusions of law,"
on the other.' 4
The system of fact pleading thus ushered in by the Field
Code of Procedure spread like wildfire throughout the country,
and within three-quarters of a century following its adoption in
New York, twenty-seven other American jurisdictions had en-
acted procedural codes requiring fact pleading.15
DEFECTS OF FACT PLEADING
This new American system of pleading had been founded
upon certain assumptions which failed to materialize in actual
practice. The distinction between ultimate facts, evidentiary
facts, and conclusions of law-which had been thought to be
very elementary and quite simple-caused untold difficulties to
attorneys and judges alike who found themselves floundering in
the "morass of decisions as to whether a particular allegation is
one of fact, evidence or law."'16 "Quite commonly an allegation
has been held bad as a statement of law only."'1 As a conse-
quence, outright miscarriages of justice resulted through the dis-
missal of the action when, through inadvertence or lack of skill,
the pleader failed to include sufficient ultimate facts in his com-
plaint or petition to disclose a cause of action. Prolonged and
useless delays resulted from the testing of the sufficiency of the
12. The indebtedness of the David Dudley Field Code of Procedure to
the Louisiana Code of Practice is now generally recognized and admitted.
Clark on Code Pleading 28, note 70 (2 ed. 1947). "'From it very many of the
best portions of the Field Code were adopted.' 19 A.B.A. Rep. 427, 1896; 54 Alb.
L.J. 198, at 204, 1896."
18. New York Code of Procedure § 120 (1848).
14. Clark on Code Pleading 225 (2 ed. 1947).
15. Id. at 24.
16. 1 Moore's Federal Practice 553 (1938).
17. Clark on Code Pleading 228 (2 ed. 1947).
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pleadings, and in amendments thereof when necessary and
permitted.
Few attorneys ever make as complete a preparation of their
case, and as thorough a sifting and evaluation of their evidence,
before the drafting of their pleadings as they do prior to trial.
Further, few attorneys know definitely where they stand with
respect to the evidence available to the opposing party at the time
the pleadings are drafted. As a consequence, the complaint or
petition usually alleges every single fact having a tendency to
sustain the claim, whenever supported to any extent by any
evidence available to the plaintiff; and conversely, the answer
usually denies every single fact in the initial pleading refuted
by any evidence available to defendant. On the trial of the case,
or through the use of discovery, the pleader may be confronted
with such overwhelming proof to the contrary on some such
allegations that they are not relied upon seriously thereafter.
Unless counsel is a clairvoyant; however, or would be willing to
abandon potential grounds of attack or defense on a hunch that
he may not be able to establish them, these allegations will
always be included in the pleading. In the light of these factors,
in a number of jurisdictions which had adopted the system it was
felt that fact pleading had failed signally in the execution of its
intended functions of formulating the issues, and apprising the
opposing party of the evidence available to the pleader.
Gradually, it became apparent that too much was expected
of pleading; that pretrial procedure was a much more efficient
device for narrowing the issues; and that an adequate system
of discovery was much more effective in permitting the parties
to determine what evidence would be available to their adver-
saries than any system of pleading could ever be.
THE REACTION AGAINST FACT PLEADING
By the end of the first quarter of the present century, it was
realized by many students of procedure that, under the regime
of fact pleading, entirely too much of the time and energies of
counsel and of the courts was consumed in the determination of
questions which had little if any bearing on the merits of the
cases. A reaction against the system had definitely set in. The
Illinois Practice Act, which went into effect in 1933, was the first
procedural code which sought to avoid fact pleading18-an effort
18. Professor Edward M. Hinton, then of the University of Chicago law
faculty and one of the advisers of the committee which drafted the Civil
[VOL. XIII
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which was to prove unsuccessful.19 Complete success in escap-
ing from the rules of fact pleading, however, was definitely
obtained under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,0 which
went into effect in 1938. The impetus toward the simplification
of pleading given by this procedural reform became evident
almost immediately.
Since 1938, six states 21 have adopted the modified notice
pleading of the Federal Rules without qualification, through the
provisions of procedural rules or statutes taken almost verbatim
from Federal Rule 8 (a). The new procedural provisions of an
additional state, South Dakota, while definitely under the influ-
ence of the Federal Rules with respect to the desirability of
suppressing fact pleading, incorporated rules which are strikingly
similar to the simple system of pleading which obtained in Loui-
siana under the Practice Act of 1805 and the Code of Practice
of 1825.22 The new Texas Rules of Civil procedure, which in
Practice Act of Illinois, states that "The Committee .. . decided to omit the
word 'facts' in order to minimize so far as possible the controversy that has
arisen in so many code states where pleadings have been constantly attacked
as setting out conclusions rather than facts." Cook, "Facts" and "Statements
of Facts," 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 233 (1937). If so, the committee failed to use
language in the statute sufficiently strong to accomplish its purpose. As a
result, Professor Robert W. Millar of the Northwestern University law
faculty predicted quite early that the new legislation would not accomplish
its apparent purpose of dispensing with the pleading of full factual particu-
lars. Millar, Pleading Under the Illinois Practice Act, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 460, 462
(1934). This prediction appears to have been accurate. See note 19, infra.
19. Professor 0. L. McCaskill, then of the University of Illinois law
faculty and another adviser of the committee which drafted the Illinois Civil
Practice Act, disagreed with Professor Hinton as to the effect of the pertinent
language of the statute. "A plain and concise statement of the pleader's
cause of action, counterclaim, defense, or reply, . . . is a statement of the
ultimate and issuable facts essential to a good cause of action, defense, or
reply. The substance of good pleading, as it has heretofore been understood
in this state, is retained without change." McCaskill, Illinois Civil Practice
Act Annotated 64 (1933). The subsequent Illinois cases seem to have sus-
tained this position. Leitch v. Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 369 Ill. 469, 17 N.E.
2d 34 (1938); Crosby v. Weil, 382 Ill. 538, 48 N.E. 2d 386 (1943); Stenwall v.
Bergstrom, 398 Ill. 377, 75 N.E. 2d 864 (1947); Sawicki v. Clemons, 408 Ill. 55,
95 N.E. 2d 875 (1950); Woods v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 314 Ill. App. 340,
41 N.E. 2d 235 (1942); Burr v. State Bank of St. Charles, 344 Ill. App. 332, 100
N.E. 2d 773 (1951).
20. Clark on Code Pleading 241 et seq. 2 ed. 1947).
21. Arizona: Ariz. Code Ann. 21-404 (1939).
Colorado: Rule 8 (a), Rules of Civil Procedure. To insure the abolition
of fact pleading, Colorado Rule 8 (e, 1) provides that "Pleadings otherwise
meeting the requirements of these rules shall not be considered objectionable
for failure to state ultifimate facts, as distinguished from conclusions of law."
Delaware: Rule 8 (a), Rules of Civil Procedure.
Minnesota: Rule 8.01, Rules of Civil Procedure.
New Mexico: Rule 8, Rules of Civil Procedure.
Utah: Rule 8 (a), Rules of Civil Procedure.
22. South Dakota Code (1939) 33:0903, 0908. "A pleading which sets forth
a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim or crossclaim,
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earlier drafts sought to suppress the technical rules of fact plead-
ing,23 eventually incorporated two rule provisions 24 which make
it extremely difficult to classify the present system of pleading
in that state.2
While the impact of the Federal Rules upon procedural
philosophies in America has been tremendous, and while all of
the newer procedural rules have borrowed extensively from fed-
eral practice, considerable resistance has met efforts to elim-
inate the rules of fact pleading. As a result, six states which have
adopted new rules of civil procedure, or which have amended
their procedural codes and statutes to embody many of the
shall contain: (1) A plain statement of the claim constituting the cause of
action .. " 33:0903. "Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise
and direct. No technical forms of pleading or motion are required." 33:0908.
23. "The proposed change which elicited the most discussion related to
the definition and system of pleading. Under the suggested rules pleading
will 'consist of a statement in plain and concise language of the plaintiff's
grounds of recovery or the defendant's ground of defense. That an allegation
be evidentiary or be of legal conclusion shall not be ground for objection
when fair notice to the opponent is given by the allegation as a whole.' The
effect of this change Is to sweep away at one time the unworkable require-
ment of 'fact' pleading and the technicality incident to requirement of the
statement of a 'cause of action.'" McDonald, Civil Rules Begin To Take
Form, 3 Texas Bar J. 179, 180 (1940).
24. Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 45 (b) and 47. "Pleadings in the
district and county court shall ... (b) Consist of a statement in plain and
concise language of the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's grounds
of defense. That an allegation be evidentiary or be of legal conclusion shall
not be ground for objection when fair notice to the opponent is given by
the allegations as a whole .. " Rule 45 (b). "A pleading which sets forth a
claim for relief, whether an original petition, counterclaim, crossclaim, or
third party claim, shall contain (a) a short statement of the cause of action
sufficient to give fair notice of the claim involved ...." Rule 47.
25. Apparently, the members of the profession participating in the draft-
ing of the new Texas Rules were of the opinion that the rigors of fact
pleading had been relaxed appreciably. On this point, see the comments,
under a subtitle significantly labelled "Demotion of Fact Pleading," in Stay-
ton, The Scope and Function of Pleading Under the New Federal and Texas
Rules: A Comparison, 20 Texas L. Rev. 16, 23 (1941). On the other hand, the
great majority of Texas practitioners consulted advised the officers of the
Louisiana State Law Institute rather emphatically that the new Texas Rules
made no change in their system of pleading in this respect, and that the
rules of fact pleading still obtained in that state.
The reported Texas cases offer no convincing evidence on the subject,
either pro or con, due to their failure to quote from, or to describe in suffi-
cient detail, the allegations of the questioned pleadings. Some appear to
support Judge Stayton's position, or at least to indicate a liberality of
pleading seldom found in the Louisiana decisions of the past forty years.
Cox v. Eckstrom, 163 S.W. 2d 845, 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Winslow v. Boyd,
195 S.W. 2d 384, 386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Andrews v. Daniel, 240 S.W. 2d
1018 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). Others apply the pertinent provisions of the new
rules in a manner, and with language, indicating rather strongly that the
rules of fact pleading are presently in full operation. Hankey v. Employer's
Casualty Co., 176 S.W. 2d 357, 360 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Garza v. De Leon,
193 S.W. 2d 844, 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); King v. Harris County Flood Con-
trol Dist., 210 S.W. 2d 438, 441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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provisions of the Federal Rules, have retained the requirement
that the ultimate facts of the cause of action or defense be
pleaded.26
PLEADING UNDER THE LOUISIANA PRACTICE ACT OF 1805
The Practice Act of 1805, commonly known as the Living-
ston Practice Act, was primarily a refinement and simplification
of contemporary chancery practice.2 7 At least one of its more
important provisions, however, bore on its face evidence of the
influence of the Spanish procedural law which it superseded. 28
The first section of this statute 29 provided, in part:
"That all suits in the superior court shall be commenced
by petition, addressed to the court, which shall state the
names of the parties, their places of residence, and the cause
of action, with the necessary circumstances of places and
dates, and shall conclude with a prayer for relief, adapted
to the circumstances of the case ... "
The provisions of the statute ° prescribing the rules for the
pleading of the answer are to be found in the fifth section, and
read, in part, as follows:
"That every answer . . . shall without evasion, answer
every material fact stated in the plaintiff's petition; shall
avoid all matter scandalous, libellous or impertinent, and
where it contains a denial of the facts stated in the petition,
or states any new fact in avoidance thereof, and the defen-
dant wishes a trial by a jury, such [answer] shall conclude
with a prayer to that effect...."
These requirements of the answer immediately suggest a
system of fact pleading, particularly the words "every material
fact"-substantially the language of our present Pleading and
Practice Act.31 If it is fact pleading, then certainly it cannot be
26. Florida: Rule 9 (a, b), Rules of Civil Procedure.
Iowa: Rule 70, Rules of Civil Procedure.
Missouri: Mo. Stats. Ann. (1945) 847.36.
New Jersey: Rule 3:8-1, Rules Governing Civil Practice in the Supe-
rior Court.
Pennsylvania: Rule 1019, Rules of Civil Procedure.
Washington: Revised Code (1951) 4.32.040.
27. Millar, The Fortunes of the Demurrer, 31 Ill. L. Rev. 596, 604 (1937).
28. Compare the language of Partida 3. 2. 40, Los Codigos de las Siete
Partidas (Moreau-Lislet & Carleton's Trans., 1820), vol. 1, pp. 57-58, with Acts
of the Territory of Orleans 1805, c. 26, § 1.
29. Acts of the Territory of Orleans (1805), c. 26, § 1.
30. Id. at § 5.
31. La. R.S. 1950, 13:3601.
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attributed to the influence of the Field Code of New York, for
the latter was not adopted until some forty-three years later.
Could it have been the reverse, and were these provisions the
fountain-head of the American system of fact pleading? If so,
then this most interesting fact has been completely missed by
Professor Hepburn, Judge Clark, and all of the other students
of procedure who have done such careful research into the source
of fact pleading.
Before we impulsively jump at the conclusion that Edward
Livingston was the originator of fact pleading, let us not forget
that all systems of pleading require the allegation of some facts,
and even some factual particulars. Where are the requirement
of pleading ultimate facts, the prohibition against the pleading
of conclusions of law, and the requirement of pleading full par-
ticulars in all cases? The statute sets forth none of these; but
very convincing evidence is available that this act negatives two
of these requirements-those of pleading ultimate facts and full
factual particulars in all cases. The sixth section of the Practice
Act 32 provided, in part, that
"All facts intended to be relied on by the plaintiff or
defendant and submitted to a jury shall, at least two days
before such trial, be drawn up by the party intending to
submit the same, and delivered to the judge or judges, to-
gether with an abstract of the substantial parts of the petition
and answer, each prepared by the party filing the same, and
upon receiving them, the court shall examine whether such
facts are within the pleadings and strike out such as do not
fairly arise out of the petition or answer ... "
This legislation was supplemented by an 1817 act 33 which
elaborated on the procedure to be followed in submitting special
issues to the jury, and required the judge to pass upon the per-
tinency of the facts alleged in this statement.
Except in those cases where the plaintiff relied upon facts
in avoidance of the defense, why would it have been necessary
to prepare this statement of facts relied on by each party, if the
pleadings were required to set forth the ultimate facts and full
factual particulars in all cases? Would it not have been simpler
in such a case to have required the parties to read their pleadings
to the jury, just as is done even today in civil cases in Texas?
32. Acts of the Territory of Orleans (1805), c. 26, § 6.
33. Act of Jan. 28, 1817, § 10, La. Acts of 1817, pp. 24, 32.
[VOL. XIII
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If these statutes were intended to cover only those cases where
the plaintiff relied on an avoidance of the defense, why were
these statutes not limited to such cases? Workman, Edward
Livingston's own attorney, in Livingston v. Heerman34 success-
fully contended that only the second statute was intended to
apply to cases where the plaintiff relied on facts in avoidance of
the defense. He argued that: 35
"The first law on this subject, 2 Martin's Digest, 156,
ordains that the court shall examine whether such facts, &c,
are within the pleadings, and strike out such as do not fairly
arise out of the petition or answer. The next statute on the
same point declares, that the pertinency of the statements
of facts, shall be judged of by the court. The legislature
adopted this last expression, no doubt, on considering the
frequent scantiness and insufficiency of our written plead-
ings; and that many facts might be pertinent to a cause,
although not fairly arising out of the petition or answer in
it. This may often happen, from our very defective practice
of not filing replications, even when pleas and exceptions
are made, which contain new matter, and various distinct
facts."
The court, in accepting this argument, said: 36
"There is another bill of exceptions in which the defen-
dant objects to the opinion of the judge, on the pertinency
of the facts submitted to the jury.
"The first law on this subject, contained in 2 Martin's
Digest, 156, ordains that the court shall examine whether
the facts are within the pleadings, and strike out such as do
not fairly arise out of the petition and answer. The next
statute on the same point, Act of the legislature, 1817, page 32,
sec. 10, directs that the pertinency of the statement of facts
shall be judged of by the court.
"If the legislature intended these statutes to have the
construction contended for by the defendant in this case,
that the facts stated in the petition and answer should be
submitted, and nothing else, there would not have been any
necessity to provide that the parties should draw up a state-
34. 9 Mart. (O.S.) 656 (La. 1821).
35. Brief for the plaintiff in Livingston v. Heerman, 9 Mart. (O.S.) 656,
664 (La. 1821).
36. Livingston v. Heerman, 9 Mart. (O.S.) 656, 709 (La. 1821).
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ment of the facts, and that the pertinency should be judged
of by the court."
Even more convincing evidence that ultimate facts and full
factual particulars were not required in all cases is presented in
the opinion in Bethemont v. Davis,7 decided one year earlier,
where, in answering the question squarely, the court said:
"It is necessary, as we have already said, in the case of
Harvey v. Fitzgerald [6 Mart. (O.S.) 530], that such cer-
tainty should prevail in pleading, as to put each party on his
guard. Therefore, wherever a party attempts to introduce
evidence in support of some ground of defence, distinct
from those which are set up in the pleadings, such evidence
ought to be refused. But, to require the suitors to specify
in their pleadings particular facts, out of which, the truth
of a general allegation will result, would, we apprehend, be
creating embarrassment, in the administration of justice,
for no possible good purpose."
In two cases decided during the period when the Practice
Act of 1805 was in effect, the court did hold that evidence would
not be admitted in support of a ground not pleaded adequately.
One of these was Harvey v. Fitzgerald,38 cited in the quotation
above, where the court refused to consider the defense of illegal-
ity of the contract sued on, which had not been raised in the
defendant's pleadings. In the other, 9 evidence was excluded on
the ground that "The facts alleged in the defendant's answer in
the present case, to avoid the plaintiff's claim, and which amount
to a reconvention, are not set forth with a sufficient statement of
circumstances of place and date." In both of these cases, the
pleading failed to provide fair notice to the adversary; and in
both the pleadings would have been held insufficient under any
system of pleading.
Proof that no more was expected of pleading under the Prac-
tice Act of 1805 than is expected of it today in the United States
district courts is afforded by Ralston v. Barclay.40 There, plaintiff
sought to introduce evidence showing the gross negligence and
fraud of defendant, when no specific allegations thereof had been
set forth in the petition. The Supreme Court held that such alle-
gations should have been made in the petition; but nonetheless
37. 8 Mart. (O.S.) 391, 392-393 (La. 1820).
38. 6 Mart. (O.S.) 530, 549-551 (La. 1819).
39. Stroud v. Beardslee, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 84, 86-87 (La. 1824).
40. 6 Mart. (O.S.) 649, 12 Am. Dec. 483 (La. 1819).
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sustained the trial judge's action in admitting this evidence. The
rationale of the court's position appears from the following
excerpt from its opinion:
41
"Had the evidence in the present case been offered by
the plaintiff, such as it appears to be, in support of the allega-
tions in his petition, and were there no circumstances ex-
hibited by the record, which show that the counsel for the
defendants had perfect knowledge of the charges which they
were called on to contest, we should probably be of opinion
that the exception ought to be sustained. But it appears they
had such knowledge before they entered on the trial of the
cause, from the manner in which the cross-examination of
the plaintiff's witnesses is conducted, and other incidents; it
is believed, that now to overrule the opinion of the district
court, in admitting the evidence, would be doing injustice,
as the object of certainty and explicitness, in setting forth
the [cause] of action in a petition, is to inform the defendant
of the claims and pretensions against which he has to
contend."
Fair notice to the adversary was the primary objective of
the pleadings, and if the adversary had such knowledge aliunde
the pleadings, then the latter's insufficiencies could be disre-
garded. This is definitely not fact pleading, but a modified notice
pleading in its most liberal aspects.
PLEADING UNDER THE LOUISIANA CODE OF PRACTICE OF 1825
The new procedural code adopted in 1825 retained the orig-
inal simplicity of pleading of the Livingston Practice Act, though
perhaps it moved a degree closer to the procedural law in Spain.
The requirements of the petition included all those set forth in
the first section of the Practice Act, but now Partida 3. 2. 40 was
tracked by the requirement of a clear and concise statement, not
only of the cause of action but also "of the object of the demand,
as well as the nature of the title. '4
2
The essentials of the answer were stated more fully than in
the Practice Act in a number of articles in the new code. The
initial one 48 provided that:
"The answer must ... express the name, surname and
41. 6 Mart. (O.S.) 649, 650, 651.
42. Art. 172 (4), La. Code of Practice of 1825.
43. Art. 319, La. Code of Practice of 1825.
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residence of the defendant, as well as the name of the plain-
tiff; and it must be free from all abusive, defamatory, or
impertinent expressions.
"It must conclude by praying that the demand of the
plaintiff be rejected, and that he be sentenced to pay the
costs of the suit; unless the defendant himself should inci-
dentally plead compensation or some other exception."
A general denial was expressly permitted. "When the defen-
dant answers to the merits, he is not bound to answer specially
to all the allegations contained in the petition; it is sufficient to
deny, generally, all of the facts stated, except he be called upon
either to acknowledge or to deny his signature. ' 44 The pleading
of additional facts by the defendant found express recognition
in the new code. "The defendant in his answer may allege facts
different from those alleged by the plaintiff, and bring an inci-
dental demand, when the same grows out of the action, or is
specially permitted by law. '45 Despite the criticism of the Living-
ston Practice Act voiced by attorneys trained under the common
law because of its failure to permit replications, an express pro-
hibition of replicatory pleadings was embodied in the new code.
"When the defendant in his answer alleges on his part new facts,
these shall be considered as denied by the plaintiff, therefore,
neither replication nor rejoinder shall be admitted. '46
The Code of Practice of 1825, like its predecessor, the Practice
Act of 1805, required the pleading of some -facts in all cases. But
the articles made no mention of ultimate facts, contained no
requirement of the pleading of full factual particulars (except
as noted in the following sentence), and did not expressly pro-
hibit the pleading of conclusions of law. That full factual particu-
lars were not considered necessary in all cases was attested by
the new code provisions expressly requiring a statement of the
full factual particulars in the petitions for conservatory writs47
and extraordinary writs, 48 which had to be verified by the affi-
davits of plaintiff or his counsel. The Code of Practice provisions
dropped the word "material" from the "material facts" of the
Livingston Practice Act, but this was a matter of no consequence,
44. Art. 323, La. Code of Practice of 1825.
45. Art. 328, La. Code of Practice of 1825.
46. Art. 329, La. Code of Practice of 1825.
47. See Arts. 214, 243, 276, 287, 291, 304, La. Code of Practice of 1825.
48. See Arts. 795, 799, 840, 847, 848, and 859, La. Code of Practice of 1825.
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as the new code actually made no change in the rules of pleading
in ordinary cases in Louisiana.
During the first three-quarters of a century following the
adoption of the Code of Practice of 1825, the decided cases offered
no evidence that the technical rules of fact pleading played any
part whatsoever in our procedure. We find no mention of ultimate
or evidentiary facts, no requirement of the pleading of full factual
particulars in all cases, and no prohibtion against the pleading
of conclusions of law. In one of the very first cases decided under
the new procedural code, the Supreme Court of Louisiana indi-
cated a spirit of liberality to accord with the simplicity of plead-
ing contemplated by the new code. In Ory v. Winter,49
"The plaintiff objected to [the] proof being received,
because the fact was not put at issue by the pleadings. The
court below sustained the objections; and gave as a reason
for doing so, that pleas should be so certain that the opposite
party might be apprised of the nature of the defence set up,
and of the proof that will be probably introduced.
"One of the most valuable features of our jurisprudence,
is the simplicity with which parties are permitted to bring
their rights before the tribunals of justice. Those technicali-
ties which, in other countries, embarrass and obstruct the
progress of justice, are unknown to it. All it requires is, that
each party should allege his grounds of attack or defense
so specially, that the adversary shall not be taken unawares,
by matters springing up on the trial of which he is not
apprised by the pleadings; and that the judgment which may
be rendered on the issue joined, will enable him, against
whom it has been given, to protect himself by the plea of
res judicata, should a subsequent demand be made for the
same thing."
In this case the Supreme Court admitted that the answer
did not afford fair notice to the plaintiff of the ground supported
by the evidence offered, but held that this was of no consequence,
as the plaintiff had knowledge of the ground of defense from the
questions asked in the taking of depositions before trial. Ralston
v. Barclay5 was relied upon.
The Ory case was not an isolated one. The Supreme Court
49. 4 Mart. (N.S.) 277, 279-280 (La. 1826).




repeatedly held that the primary purpose of pleading was fair
notice to 'the adversary, and even if this had not been given by
the pleadings, if the adverse party had been informed otherwise
of the ground of attack or defense so that the evidence offered
had not surprised him, the evidence should have been admitted.
Knowledge aliunde the pleadings was held a satisfactory substi-
tute for sufficient pleadings if it was received by the adverse party
through the taking of depositions prior to trial,5 ' information
given to his counsel before the trial,52 the urging of the ground
at a prior trial, 5 3 evidence attempted to be introduced at a prior
trial,54 letters writen to the adverse party prior to institution of
suit,5 5 or however received if the testimony of the objecting party
showed he had such knowledge prior to trial.56
Further, even in those cases where the only notice to the
adversary was that afforded by the pleadings, the allegation of
full factual particulars or details was not deemed necessary. All
the cases required was that the substance of the demand or de-
fense had to be set forth in the pleadings. This is made quite
clear from the opinion in Florance v. Nixonr,5 7 where it was said:
"The form which the petitioners have given to their
action; and the necessity imposed on them to furnish proof
of the special damage they may have sustained, formed the
principal matter of argument at the bar. We have already
expressed an opinion on the first point, in disposing of the
exception; and we may add that our law has not prescribed
any particular form in which parties shall state their cause
of action. It requires nothing more than that the substance
of the case should be plainly set out; and if this is done,
exceptions merely technical cannot affect it."
If the "substance of the case" consisted of allegations which
actually were conclusions of law, this proved quite immaterial.
Thus, in La Ferriere v. Bynum,5 8 in a suit brought against the
makers and endorsers of a note, the court held a petition sufficient
which annexed the note sued on and averred "That at the proper
51. Ory v. Winter, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 277, 279-280 (La. 1826); Ives v. Eastin,
6 La. 13, 16 (1833). See, also, Frierson v. Irwin, 5 La. Ann. 525, 531 (1850).
52. Tracy v. Tuyes, 7 Mart. (N.S.) 354, 356 (La. 1829).
53. Duplantier v. Newcomb, 2 La. Ann. 279, 280 (1847).
54. Rabun v. Cage, 23 La. Ann. 675, 676 (1871).
55. Lowber v. McCoy, 12 La. Ann. 795 (1857); Pecoul v. Auge, 18 La. Ann.
614 (1866).
56. Davis v. Barham, 10 La. Ann. 528 (1855).
57. 3 La. 289, 292 (1832).
58. 12 La. 587 (1938).
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time, due and legal demand was made of the payment of said
note, at the proper place, and payment refused." All require-
ments of fair notice were met, as the "proper time" could only
mean the date of maturity, and the "proper place" could only
mean the place stipulated in the note for its payment. But
whether the note was presented for payment at the proper time
and at the proper place depended upon factual particulars which
were not stated in the petition. What a field day some of our
fact pleading enthusiasts would have had, arguing an exception
of no cause of action in behalf of the endorsers and levelled at
the allegations that the presentment of the note at the proper
time and place were conclusions of law, not supported by the
necessary factual particulars as to when and where the note was
presented for payment.
Similarly, in Clay v. Fisher,"9 the Supreme Court held a
petition sufficient, in a suit brought to recover certain movables
in the possession of defendant. The fact that conclusions of law
were given full legal effect, as long as they gave fair notice, is
indicated by the following passage from the opinion:
"The judge did not, in our opinion, err, in overruling
the defendant's exception. The averments that the defendant
took illegal possession of the objects claimed, and continued
to withhold them wrongfully, are sufficiently distinct and
explicit to put the defendant upon his defence, if any he had
to oppose the action."
Limitations of space will not permit the review of a number
of other cases60 illustrating the liberality with which our Supreme
Court viewed pleadings during this period, the generality of
averment which was sanctioned, and the complete absence of
technical rules limiting allegations to those of ultimate fact and
giving no effect to the pleadings of conclusions of law.
The revision of the two Louisiana codes following the Civil
War did nothing more than delete all references to slaves and
59. 2 La. Ann. 997 (1847).
60. Ditto v. Barton, 6 Mart. (N.S.) 127 (La. 1827); Frierson v. Irwin, 5 La.
Ann. 525 (1850); State ex rel. Morgan's Louisiana & Texas Railroad & Steam-
ship Co. v. Judge, 33 La. Ann. 954 (1881); Doullut v. McManus, 37 La. Ann. 800
(1885). See, also, Lawson v. Ripley, 17 La. 238 (1841); Succession of McLean,
5 La. Ann. 671 (1850); Gayarre v. Tunnard, 9 La. Ann. 254 (1854).
Conversely, there are a few cases where the pleadings were held bad,
but all likewise would have been held insufficient under the Practice Act of
1805. These cases include: Pargoud v. Guice, 6 La. 75, 25 Am. Dec. 202 (1833);
Cox v. Robinson, 2 Rob. 313 (La. 1842); Perkins v. Potts, 8 La. Ann. 14 (1853);




slavery, and to integrate therein all of the special statutes passed
since 1825 which related to the various subjects regulated by
these codes. The Code of Practice of 1870 made no change what-
soever in the rules of pleading, and retained verbatim the lan-
guage of all provisions relating to pleading under identical article
numbers.
There was, however, one discordant note sounded late in this
period. The earlier Louisiana cases had always permitted amend-
ment of the petition freely,61 even when the amendment removed
the basis of an exception of no cause of action which had been
sustained. 62 In 1880, in Burbank v. Harris,63 our Supreme Court
reversed its position and held that no amendment of the petition
would be permitted after an exception of no cause of action had
been sustained. This technical rule was applied at least five
times 64 during the next fourteen years. These cases were not the
result of the influence of the rules of fact pleading, as none of
these rules was applied; and in all of the cases the pleadings were
so deficient that they would have been held insufficient even
during the regime of the Livingston Practice Act. But they indi-
cated a weaning from the liberality which had obtained during
the first fifty years under the Code of Practice of 1825. The legal
profession in Louisiana was becoming prepared mentally for
the reception of the technical rules of fact pleading.
FACT PLEADING IN LOUISIANA
Apparently, the influence of fact pleading began to assert
itself in Louisiana somewhere around the turn of the present
century. No Louisiana cases of this period could be found which
conclusively indicated this; but one or two of the forms con-
61. Sinnet v. Mulhollan, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 398 (La. 1814); Vavasseur v.
Bayon, 11 Mart. (O.S.) 639 (La. 1822); De Buys v. Mollere, 2 Mart. (N.S.) 625
(La. 1824); McCubbin v. Hastings, 27 La. Ann. 713 (1875).
62. McCubbin v. Hastings, 27 La. Ann. 713 (1875).
63. Burbank v. Harris, 32 La. Ann. 395 (1880). The petition in this case
failed to aver ownership of the property.
64. E. J. Hart & Co. v. Bowie, 34 La. Ann. 323 (1882)-petition in a
revocatory action failed to allege the insolvency of the transferor; Raymond
v. Palmer, 35 La. Ann. 276 (1883)-petition of the receivers of an insolvent
bank, in a suit against the former officers and directors, averred only that
defendants permitted two directors to withdraw deposits after the bank had
become insolvent; First Nat. Bank v. Moss, 41 La. Ann. 227, 6 So. 25 (1889)-
attachment dissolved, suit on three unmatured drafts; Abadie v. Berges, 41
La. Ann. 281, 6 So. 529 (1889)-petition to enforce reduction in rent on
renewed lease failed to aver plaintiff's exercise of the option to renew lease;
Egan v. Fush, 46 La. Ann. 474, 15 So. 539 (1894)-sequestration dissolved, debt
sued on not then exigible.
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tained in a formulary6 5 published in 1903 offer fairly convincing
proof that, at least in negligence cases, the pleading of full
factual particulars was either required or considered the safer
practice. Six years later the rules of fact pleading were accepted
by the Supreme Court of Louisiana.
State v. Hackley, Hume & Joyce66 was not only one of the
most important cases ever decided by our Supreme Court, but
one of the most interesting as well. There, the State of Louisiana
sued to recover certain lands, and to annul the patents thereto,
on the ground of fraud alleged to have been practiced upon the
sovereign by the original entrymen, the ancestors in title of the
defendants. To negative the possibility that the defendants might
be considered purchasers in good faith without knowledge of the
fraud of the entrymen, the state alleged that the defendants
claimed the land under a title which had emanated from the
entrymen, and that the defendants were "holders in bad faith."
The trial court had sustained an exception of no cause of action
which had been based on the contention that the state had
failed to tender the price which had been paid by the entrymen,
together with taxes and interest on both amounts. On the state's
appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendants again urged their
exception; but in the appellate court they further contended
that the petition had not alleged that the defendants had been
parties or privies to the alleged fraud of the entrymen, or that
the defendants had ever had knowledge thereof, actual or con-
structive. "No particulars, or facts, or circumstances of any
kind, are set forth which would constitute defendants possessors
in bad faith. This charge is therefore a general and vague charge,
without any specifications whatever."
Under the settled principles of the Louisiana pleading of
that period, since the plaintiff's petition had been sufficiently
definite to have afforded notice to the defendants of the sub-
stance of the cause of action, and to have afforded defendant the
protection of res judicata, the petition should have been held
sufficient. It was so held on the original hearing, where the
courts said: 67
"A pleader in the courts of this state has the right to
make use of terms which are specifically defined by the law
65. Flemming, A Formulary of Civil Procedure (1903). See, in particular,
the form of the petition in a personal injury suit, p. 252.
66. 124 La. 854, 50 So. 772 (1909).
67. 124 La. 854, 858, 50 So. 772, 774.
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of the state, without giving the definitions. Thus, when one
sues an universal legatee, a widow in community, or the
indorser of a note, he is not required to recite the provisions
of law which establish these relations, and so, we think,
that, in alleging that the defendants are holders in bad faith
of the land here claimed, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged
that they assumed, and are assuming, to be the owners of it,
well knowing that the titles under which they claim are
vicious or defective, and, if that allegation be true (and it is
taken as true, for the purposes of the exception), plaintiff is
entitled to recover. The exception of no cause of action
should therefore have been overruled."
This original opinion was rendered by the Supreme Court
on April 26, 1909. A rehearing was applied for and was granted.
Volume 31 of the Cyclopedia of Law and Procedure (31 Cyc.)
was released by the publisher during the same year, and appar-
ently had not been available at the time defendants' original
brief had been written. This volume contained an excellent
monograph on the subject of "Pleading" written by Professor
Edson R. Sunderland, of the University of Michigan Law School,
which had integrated into the subject all of the rules of fact
pleading, then so popular throughout the country. Excerpts from
this monograph changed the procedural philosophy of Louisiana
immediately. The opinion on rehearing in the Hackley, Hume &
Joyce case, rendered on November 29, 1909, reversed the former
position of the Supreme Court, and affirmed the judgment of the
trial court which had maintained the exception. In its opinion
on rehearing, the court said: 61
"The said allegation of the defendants being holders in
bad faith, or in other words, of their title being vicious or
defective and their knowing it, being nothing more than the
allegation of a conclusion of law, is no allegation at all, since
the allegation of a conclusion of law is no allegation. It 'does
not aid a pleading.' 31 Cyc. 51. 'Facts, not conclusions of
law, must be alleged in pleadings.' Id. An exception of no
cause of action admits the well-pleaded facts, not the con-
clusions of law, contained in the petition. 6 Eng. P1. & Proc.
336; 31 Cyc. 333; Fertilizer Co. v. Wolf, 48 La. Ann. 631, 19
South. 558; State ex rel. v. Judge, 50 La. Ann. 266-273, 23
South. 839.
68. 124 La. 854, 863-864, 50 So. 772, 775-776.
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"A pleader is not required to allege the evidentiary or
intermediate facts; but he must at least allege the ultimate
facts. Otherwise how can his adversary know what facts he
must come prepared to disprove. In the instant case, the
evidentiary or intermediate facts are all the circumstances
from which the state seeks to draw the conclusion that the
defendants and their several predecessors in title acquired
the lands without valuable consideration, or else with notice
of the alleged fraud. The ultimate fact is their having ac-
quired the lands without consideration, or else with notice
of the alleged fraud. This ultimate fact needed to be stated,
because until it was stated there was nothing to show that
the said titles, constituting the alleged chain of title of defen-
dants, were not good. 'Ultimate facts of necessity are con-
clusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts; but
legal conclusions cannot be pleaded as ultimate facts.' 31
Cyc. 70.
"... The pleader is allowed to dispense with the eviden-
tiary or intermediate facts, and to content himself with alleg-
ing the ultimate facts; but further than this it is not possible
to go, without losing sight of the principal object of pleading,
which is to inform the adversary of what he must come pre-
pared to meet with his evidence. It is not possible to go a
step further and hold that even the ultimate facts may be
dispensed with, provided a conclusion of law is allowed from
which they may be deduced with a certain degree of
cogency ...."
Why a conclusion of law which fairly apprised the adver-
sary of what he must come prepared to prove should not have
served the purposes of the administration of justice was a matter
which the court did not take the trouble to explain. It simply
was against the rules of fact pleading. Further, the court never
seemed to realize, that it was extremely difficult to justify its
position that an allegation that the defendant was a holder in
bad faith was a conclusion of law; while allegations that the
defendants acquired the lands without valuable consideration, or
that they acquired these lands with notice of the alleged fraud
were held to be allegations of ultimate fact. As with Humpty
Dumpty, words were to mean exactly what the court intended
them to mean; and if the court saw fit to label one word pregnant
with legal connotations as a conclusion of law, and others as ulti-
mate facts, why that was the court's privilege.
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Further, the only two Louisiana precedents 9 cited in the
opinion on rehearing to support its position on ultimate facts and
conclusions of law were conservatory writ cases-injunction
suits. In both, Article 304 of the Code of Practice expressly
required the petitions to contain factual particulars, and to be
verified by the affidavits of the plaintiffs or their attorneys.
Naturally, in both cases the Supreme Court earlier had refused
to act upon statements consisting only of legal inferences, unsup-
ported by the required factual particulars, that the plaintiffs
would have suffered irreparable injury and were entitled to the
injunctive relief sought. These pleadings would be held insuffi-
cient in injunction cases in federal courts today.
In 1912, the Pleading and Practice Act 0 was adopted. This
legislative measure had been prepared by the Committee on
Jurisprudence and Law Reform of the Louisiana Bar Association,
after a study lasting more than two years.7 ' The primary objec-
tives of this act were the abolition of the general denial and the
requirement that the facts alleged or denied be set forth in num-
bered paragraphs. As adopted, the measure went somewhat fur-
ther than this. It required the verification of all pleadings which
set forth facts-thus placing all pleadings upon the same basis
as the petition in conservatory writ and extraordinary writ cases.
It also created the converse of the exceptions of no right or no
cause of action-the motion for judgment on the pleadings. For
present purposes, however, the most important feature of this
statute, which does not appear to have constituted an objective
of its draftsmen, was the words "material facts" in the require-
ment that facts be pleaded in numbered paragraphs. After the
decision in the Hackley, Hume & Joyce case, these words could
only mean "ultimate facts"-with all of the resulting implica-
tions. Fact pleading was now required by statute.
The reception of the technical rules of fact pleading was not
the only damage done by State v. Hackley, Hume, & Joyce. In
that case, the state requested, in the event the exception was
maintained, that the suit not be dismissed but that the proceed-
69. Southern Chemical & Fertilizing Co. v. Wolf, 48 La. Ann. 631, 19 So.
558 (1896); State ex rel. Capital City Oil-Mills Co. v. Monroe, 50 La. Ann. 266,
23 So. 839 (1897). The court might have cited another injunction case to the
same effect: Crescent City Live-Stock L. & S.H. Co. v. Police Jury, 32 La.
Ann. 1192 (1880).
70. La. Act 157 of 1912. As amended, this statute is now La. R.S. 1950,
13:3601.
71. See 12 La. Bar Ass'n Reports 135 et seq., 159-160 (1910); 13 La. Bar
Ass'n Reports 98 et seq., 103-108.
[VOL. XIII
1953] CASE AGAINST FACT PLEADING
ings be remanded to the trial court to permit amendment of the
petition so as to state a cause of action. This request was denied.
The court refused to permit amendment and cited Burbank v.
Harris72 in support of its position. It was held that "Unless a
cause of action is alleged, there is no suit, and hence nothing to
amend. '73 This was judicial legerdemain.74 Nevertheless this
rule was the law of Louisiana until 1936, when in Reeves v. Globe
Indemnity Company of New York 75 it was repudiated, and the
cases applying it overruled expressly.
Its companion rule, however, is still playing hob with the
administration of justice in this state. This is the requirement
that the full factual particulars of any affirmative defense be
pleaded in the answer, under penalty of the exclusion of all evi-
dence in support thereof on timely objection. 6 Here, the rules
of fact pleading are something more than nuisances-they are
deadly. Once the die is cast in the original answer, there can be
no amendment since it is said that this would change the issues.77
These rules are still being applied in actual practice.
There have been, however, light spots on the dark back-
ground. The liberal attitude of many of our present judges has
proven most encouraging. In the most important area of the real
actions, pleading has been greatly facilitated by the decision that
the allegation of "real and actual possession" was one of ultimate
fact and not a conclusion of law. 78 In a case79 decided during the
72. 32 La. Ann. 395 (1880). This case was discussed in the text supported
by note 63, supra. See, also, the cases cited in note 64, all to the same effect.
73. 124 La. 854, 869, 50 So. 772, 777 (1909).
74. More than eighteen years ago, in attacking this rule, and in what
subsequently developed to have provided the rationale for Reeves v. Globe
Indemnity Co. of New York, 185 La. 42, 168 So. 488 (1936), the writer posed
these questions in The Exception of No Cause of Action in Louisiana,
9 Tulane L. Rev. 17, 52 (1934): "Why is 'a petition which does not allege a
cause of action . . . legally speaking, no petition'? Is the court prepared to
carry its doctrine to a logical conclusion by forcing a refund of court costs
to the unfortunate litigant who paid court costs for filing what he erroneously
thought was a petition, but which he was later informed by the courts was
not? How can costs be assessed against the plaintiff? A suit can only be
initiated by the filing of a petition and if no petition has ever been filed,
defendant has never been troubled with any litigation. Everyone has simply
labored under a grand delusion that there was a lawsuit; actually (accord-
ing to the supreme court) there has never been any litigation."
75. 185 La. 42, 168 So. 488 (1936).
76. See the cases cited in note 9, supra.
77. Martin v. Toye Bros. Yellow Cab Co., 162 So. 257 (La. App. 1935) and
cases cited therein. See, also, Lobell v. Neal, 48 So. 2d 797 (La. App. 1950).
78. Ciaccio v. Hartman, 170 La. 949, 129 So. 540 (1930). See, also, Flem-
ming's Formulary 482-483, 504-506 (McEnerny's 3 ed. 1933). The generality of
averment in these illustrative pleadings appears to be supported completely
by the Ciaccio case, supra.
79. Florida Molasses Co. v. Berger, 220 La. 31, 55 So. 2d 771 (1951).
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past term, and which involved the validity of a writ of attach-
ment-an area where the strictest rules of pleading have always
been applied-the Supreme Court held that an allegation "that
the four named defendants, on or about May 13th or 14th, appro-
priated and converted" one hundred and ninety odd thousand
gallons of molasses "to their own use" was one of ultimate fact
and not a conclusion of law. 0 While it is somewhat difficult to
reconcile the holdings of these two cases with State v. Hackley,
Hume & Joyce, these later cases are in complete harmony with
our Supreme Court's present trend towards liberality of pleading.
PLEADING UNDER THE NEW CODE OF PRACTICE OF LOUISIANA
The Louisiana State Law Institute has now been working for
more than two years under its mandate l to prepare and submit
to the legislature the draft of a new Code of Practice. One of the
most controversial of all the decisions which the Institute will
have to make in its work on the new procedural code is the deter-
mination of whether fact pleading will be retained or suppressed.
Originally, three alternatives competed for acceptance with
regard to this decision. The first of these possibilities was the
adoption of the modified system of notice pleading in use in the
federal courts, through the drafting of code provisions tracking
the pertinent Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The second of
these alternatives was the return to the original simplicity of the
Code of Practice of 1825, through the suppression of the pertinent
language of the Pleading and Practice Act and the adoption of
relevant articles of the 1825 code modified by language which
would work a legislative overruling of State v. Hackley, Hume &
Joyce. The last of these possibilities was the retention of our
present system of pleading, through the blending of appropriate
provisions of the Pleading and Practice Act with pertinent articles
of the present Code of Practice.
The first alternative proved rather hypothetical even initially,
as considerable opposition manifested itself quite early to the
acceptance of any system which would not require that the cause
of action be set forth in the petition.8 2 Perhaps even more decisive
80. This case was discussed in more detail in The Work of the Louisiana
Supreme Court for the 1951-1952 Term, 13 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 306, 320
(1953).
81. La. Act 335 of 1948 directed the Louisiana State Law Institute "to
prepare comprehensive [projets] for the revision of the Civil Code of Loui-
siana and for the revision of the Code of Practice of Louisiana."
82. Under Rule 8 (a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it is not necessary
for the complaint to state, a cause of action. It must contain only "a short
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was the general feeling of members of the Council that the sys-
tem of pleading contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure worked effectively only through the extensive use of
discovery procedure, and that the small amounts involved in the
great bulk of cases in the state courts would not justify the
expense of any generous use of discovery.
The controversy which consumed the time of the Council of
the Institute for more than six months involved the choice be-
tween the second and third alternatives stated above. On Decem-
ber 12, 1952, by a vote of 13 to 10, the Council rejected the writer's
recommendation of a return to the original simplicity of the Code
of Practice of 1825, and decided to retain in principle our present
system of fact pleading. The deadly effect of this system upon
affirmative defenses pleaded only generally was sought to be
eliminated through the utmost liberality of amendment within
the discretion of the trial judge.
No opponent of fact pleading would ever be justified in
accusing the Law Institute of taking hasty or precipitate action
on the subject. This matter monopolized the major portion of the
time of the Council for more than six months. Several full dress
debates on the subject were had, and the matter was discussed
pro and con informally during the major portion of twelve days
of the Council's sessions. During the period while this issue was
under consideration, pleadings in typical cases illustrative of the
concrete differences between the two systems were drafted by
the writer, and studied by members of the Council. Corre-
spondence was had with prominent members of the bars of states
which had recently adopted new procedural rules, to obtain the
benefit of their experience. The final decision was reached after
careful consideration and evaluation of all possible factors. While
the writer naturally feels that the decision was unfortunate, he
has accepted' it in good faith and as the considered judgment of
a representative cross-section of professional opinion in Louisiana.
The purpose of this paper, therefore, is not to attempt to obtain
Council reconsideration of the issue. The writer has concluded
that the profession in Louisiana is not yet prepared to accept what
it considers so radical a change. But, in his opinion, the retention
of fact pleading in the new Code of Practice is only transitional.
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief." Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F. 2d 774 (2d Cir., 1944). This language
was selected advisedly, so as to abandon completely the concept of the code
"cause of action." Clark on Code Pleading 146 (2 ed. 1947).
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It is contemplated that the new procedural code will retain
the pretrial8 3 and discovery8 4 procedures adopted at the last ses-
sion of the Legislature of Louisiana, and that it will further pro-
vide for an effective motion for summary judgment. The present
draft of the title on Pleading, tentatively approved by the Coun-
cil of the Law Institute, includes all three. The writer is of the
opinion that, through. the continued use of these procedural
devices for not more than ten years, the profession in Louisiana
will realize that we have expected entirely too much of the plead-
ing, and that our very high expectations will not have material-
ized. Pretrial and discovery procedures will afford for the first
time effective means of formulating and narrowing the issues,
and in permitting the parties to determine what evidence is
available to their adversaries. The motion for summary judg-
ment in time will take over from the technical rules of fact plead-
ing the function of relieving litigants from the necessity of going
to trial on frivolous demands or defenses. (These rules of plead-
ing do not screen the frivolous from the meritorious demands
and defenses; they merely sift out the demands and defenses of
the inept pleader, which is not the same thing at all.)
For these reasons, the writer believes that the suppression of
fact pleading in Louisiana is not only logical and desirable, but
also (if he may be permitted to hazard the prediction) inevitable.
83. La. R.S. 1950, 13:5151, as amended by La. Act 84 of 1952.
84. La. R.S. 1950, 13:3741 through 13:3794, as added by La. Act 202 of 1952.
[VOL. XIII
